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Optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent, given
frictions in the economic environment. Constructing a model with two broad sets
of frictions — costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms and costly
exchange of wealth for goods — we ﬁnd optimal monetary policy is governed by two
familar principles.
First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be suﬃciently low, as
suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deﬂation on average. Yet, the
Keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive.
Second, as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors, the price level
should be largely stabilized, as suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deﬂationary
trend path. (In modern language, there is only small “base drift” for the price level
path as various shocks arise). Since expected inﬂation is roughly constant through
time, the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the Fisherian determinants
of the real interest rate, i.e., with expected growth or contraction of real economic
activity.
Although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in
our model economy, it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those that would
occur if prices were ﬂexible. In our benchmark model, we also ﬁnd some tendency
for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Three distinct intellectual traditions are relevant to the analysis of how optimal mon-
etary policy can and should regulate the behavior of the nominal interest rate, output
and the price level.
The Fisherian view: Early in this century, Irving Fisher [1923,1911] argued that
the business cycle was “largely a dance of the dollar” and called for stabilization
of the price level, which he regarded as the central task of the monetary authority.
Coupled with his analysis of the determination of the real interest rate [1930] and
the nominal interest rate [1896], the Fisherian prescription implied that the nominal
interest rate would ﬂuctuate with those variations in real activity which occur when
the price level is stable.
The Keynesian view: Stressing that the market-generated level of output could
be ineﬃcient, Keynes [1936] called for stabilization of real economic activity by ﬁscal
and monetary authorities. Such stabilization policy typically mandated substantial
variation in the nominal interest rate when shocks, particularly those to aggregate
demand, buﬀeted the economic system. Prices were viewed as relatively sticky and
little importance was attached to the path of the price level.
The Friedman view: Evaluating monetary policy in a long-run context with fully
ﬂexible prices, Friedman [1969] found that an application of a standard microeconomic
principle of policy analysis long used in public ﬁnance — that social and private cost
should be equated — indicated that the nominal interest rate should be approximately
zero. Later authors used the same reasoning to conclude that the nominal interest
rate should not vary through time in response to real and nominal disturbances,
working within ﬂexible price models of business ﬂuctuations.1
There are clear tensions between these three traditions if real forces produce ex-
pected changes in output growth that aﬀect the real interest rate. If the price level
is constant, then the nominal interest rate must mirror the real interest rate so that
Friedman’s rule must be violated. If the nominal interest rate is constant, as Fried-
man’s rule suggests, then there must be expected inﬂation or deﬂation to accommo-
date the movement in the real rate so that Fisher’s prescription cannot be maintained.
The variation in both inﬂation and nominal interest rates generally implied by Key-
nesian stabilization conﬂicts with both the Friedman and Fisherian views.
We construct a model economy that honors each of these intellectual traditions
and study the nature of optimal monetary policy. There are Keynesian features to
the economy: output is ineﬃciently low because ﬁrms have market power and its
ﬂuctuations reﬂect the fact that all prices cannot be frictionlessly adjusted. However,
as in the New Keynesian research on price stickiness that begins with Taylor [1980],
ﬁrms are forward-looking in their price setting and this has dramatic implications
for the design of optimal monetary policy. In our economy, there are also costs of
converting wealth into consumption. These costs can be mitigated by the use of
1See Chari and Kehoe [1999] for a survey.
1money, so that there are social beneﬁts to low nominal interest rates as in Friedman’s
analysis. The behavior of real and nominal interest rates in our economy is governed
by Fisherian principles.
Following Ramsey [1927] and Lucas and Stokey [1983], we determine the allocation
of resources that maximizes welfare (technically, it maximizes the expected, present
discounted value of the utility of a representative agent) given the resource constraints
of the economy and additional constraints that capture the fact that the resource
allocation must be implemented in a decentralized private economy.2 We assume
that there is full commitment on the part of a social planner for the purpose of
determining these allocations. We ﬁnd that two familiar principles govern monetary
policy in our economy:
The Friedman prescription for deﬂation: The average level of the nominal interest
rate should be suﬃciently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be
deﬂation on average. Yet, the Keynesian frictions generally imply that there should
be a positive nominal interest rate.
The Fisherian prescription for eliminating price-level surprises: As shocks occur
to the real and monetary sectors, the price level should be largely stabilized, as
suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deﬂationary trend path. (In modern
language, there is only a small “base drift” for the price level path). Since expected
inﬂation is relatively constant through time, the nominal interest rate must therefore
vary with the Fisherian determinants of the real interest rate. However, there is some
tendency for nominal and real interest rate smoothing relative to the outcomes in a
ﬂexible price economy.
By contrast, we ﬁnd less support for Keynesian stabilization policy. Although the
monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy,
it chooses allocations that closely resemble those which would occur if prices were
ﬂexible. When departures from this ﬂexible price benchmark occur under optimal
policy, they are not always in the traditional direction: in one example, a mone-
tary authority facing a high level of government demand chooses to contract private
consumption relative to the ﬂexible price outcome, rather than stimulating it.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we outline the main
features of our economic model and deﬁne a recursive imperfectly competitive equi-
librium. In section 3, we describe the nature of the general optimal policy problem
that we solve, which involves a number of forward-looking constraints. We outline
how to treat this policy problem in an explicitly recursive form. Our analysis thus ex-
empliﬁes a powerful recursive methodology for analyzing optimal monetary policy in
richer models that could include capital formation, state dependent pricing and other
f r i c t i o n ss u c ha se ﬃciency wages or search. In section 4, we identify four distortions
present in our economic model, which are summary statistics for how its behavior
can diﬀer from a fully competitive, nonmonetary business cycle model. In section 5,
2Our economy involves staggered prices. Ireland [1996], Goodfriend and King [2001], and Adao,
Correia and Teles [2001] use a similar approach to study economies with pre-set prices.
2we discuss calibration of a quantitative version of our model, including estimation of
a money demand function.
In section 6, we discuss the results that lead to the ﬁrst principle for monetary pol-
icy: the nominal interest rate should be set at an average level that implies deﬂation,
but it should be positive. We show how this steady-state rate of deﬂation depends
on various structural features of the economy, including the costs of transacting with
credit — which give rise to money demand — and the degree of price-stickiness.3 In
our benchmark calibration, which is based on an estimated money demand function
using post-1958 observations, the extent of this deﬂation is relatively small, about
.75%. It is larger (about 2.3%) if we use estimates of money demand based on a
longer sample beginning in 1948, which includes earlier observations when interest
rates and velocity were both low.4 In addition, a smaller degree of market power or
less price stickiness make for a larger deﬂation under optimal policy.
In section 7, we describe the near-steady state dynamics of the model under op-
timal policy. Looking across a battery of speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that these dynamics
display only minuscule variation in the price level. Thus, we document that there is
a robustness to the Fisherian conclusion in King and Wolman [1999], which is that
the price level should not vary greatly in response to a range of shocks under optimal
policy. In fact, the greatest price level variation that we ﬁnd involves less than a 05%
change in the price level over 20 quarters, in response to a productivity shock which
brings about a temporary but large deviation of output from trend, in the sense that
the cumulative output deviation is more than 10% over the twenty quarters. Across
the range of experiments, output under optimal policy closely resembles output that
would occur if all prices were ﬂexible and monetary distortions were absent. We refer
to the ﬂexible price, nonmonetary model as our underlying real business cycle frame-
work. Although there are only small deviations of quantities under optimal policy
from their real business cycle counterparts, because these deviations are temporary,
they give rise to larger departures of real interest rates from those in the RBC solu-
tion. We relate the natures of these departures to the nature of constraints on the
monetary authority’s policy problem. Section 8 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The macroeconomic model we study is designed to be representative of two recent
strands of macroeconomic research. First, we view money as a means of economizing
on the use of costly credit.5 Second, we use a new Keynesian approach to price
dynamics, viewing ﬁrms as imperfect competitors facing infrequent opportunities for
3By the steady state, we mean the point to which the economy converges under optimal policy
if there is no uncertainty.
4Lucas [2000] highlights the importance of including intervals of low interest rates for estimation
of the demand for money and the calculation of associated welfare cost measures.
5As in Prescott [1987], Dotsey and Ireland [1996], and Lacker and Schreft [1996].
3price adjustment.6 To facilitate the presentation of these mechanisms, we view the
private sector as divided into three groups of agents. First, there are households that
buy ﬁnal consumption goods and supply factors of production. These households
also trade in ﬁnancial markets for assets, including a credit market, and acquire cash
balances which can be exchanged for goods. Second, there are retailers, which sell
ﬁnal consumption goods to households and buy intermediate products from ﬁrms.
Retailers can costlessly adjust prices.7 Third, there are producers, who create the
intermediate products that retailers use to produce ﬁnal consumption goods. These
ﬁrms have market power and face only infrequent opportunities to adjust prices.
The two sources of uncertainty are the level of total factor productivity, ,a n d
the level of real government purchases, ,whichisassumedtobeﬁnanced with lump
sum taxes. These variables depend on an exogenous state variable ,w h i c he v o l v e s
over time as a Markov process, with the transition probability denoted Υ(·).T h a t
is, if the current state is  then the probability of the future state being in a given set
of states  is Υ()=P r{0 ∈  |  = }. We thus write total factor productivity
as () and real government spending as ().
In this section, we describe a recursive equilibrium in this economy, with house-
holds and ﬁrms solving dynamic optimization problems given a ﬁxed, but potentially
very complicated, rule for monetary policy that allows it to respond to all of the
relevant state variables of the economy, which are of three forms. Ignoring initially
the behavior of the monetary authority, the model identiﬁes two sets of state vari-
ables. First, there are the exogenous state variables just discussed. Second, since
some prices are sticky, predetermined prices are part of the relevant history of the
economy or, more generally, deﬁne a set of endogenous state variables. These en-
dogenous state variables, , evolve through time according to a multivalent function
Γ where 0 = Γ(0),w i t h0 being an endogenous variable described further below.
We allow the monetary authority to respond to  and , but also to an additional
vector of state variables 	, which evolves according to 	
0 = Φ(	),s ot h i si sa
third set of states. In a recursive equilibrium, 0 is a function of the monetary rule,
so that the states  evolve according to 0 = Γ(0(	)); we will sometimes write
this as 0 = Γ(	). Hence, there is a vector of state variables 
 =( 	) that is
relevant for agents, resulting from the stochastic nature of productivity and govern-
ment spending; from the endogenous dynamics due to sticky prices; and, potentially,
from the dynamic nature of the monetary rule.
2.1 Households
Households have preferences for consumption and leisure, represented by the time-
separable expected utility function,
6Taylor [1980], Calvo [1983]











The period utility function (
) is assumed to be increasing in consumption and
leisure, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable as needed. Households divide their time
allocation — which we normalize to one unit — into leisure, market work ,a n dt r a n s -
actions time  so that  +  +  =1 .
Accumulation of wealth: H o u s e h o l d sb e g i ne a c hp e r i o dw i t hap o r t f o l i oo fc l a i m s
on the intermediate product ﬁrms, holding a previously determined share  of the
per capita value of these ﬁrms. This portfolio generates current nominal dividends
of  and has nominal market value .8 They also begin each period with
a stock of nominal bonds left over from last period which have matured and have
market value . Finally, they begin each period with nominal debt arising from
consumption purchases last period, in the amount . So, their nominal wealth is
 +  +  −  − ,w h e r e is the amount of a lump sum tax paid to the
government. With this nominal wealth and current nominal wage income ,t h e y
may purchase money , buy current period bonds in amount +1, or buy more




+1 + +1 ≥  +  +  −  −  + 
We convert this nominal budget constraint into a real one, using a numeraire .A t
present this is simply an abstract measure of nominal purchasing power but we are
more speciﬁc later about its economic interpretation. Denoting the rate of inﬂation
between period −1 and period  as  = 










− ! + "
with lower case letters representing real quantities when this does not produce nota-
tional confusion (real lump sum taxes are ! = 
).9
Money and transactions: Although households have been described as purchasing
a single aggregate consumption good, we now reinterpret this as involving many
individual products — technically, a continuum of products on the unit interval — as
in many studies following Lucas [1980]. Each of these products is purchased from a
separate retail outlet at a price  . Each customer buys a fraction # of goods with
credit and the remainder with cash. Hence, the households’ demand for nominal
money satisﬁes  =( 1− #) 
. The customer’s nominal debt is correspondingly
8 and  are aggregates of the dividends and values of individual ﬁrms in a sense that we make
more precise below.
9For example  = 
 and ,  and  are similarly deﬁned. The two exceptions are the





, which must be paid next period. Following our convention of using
lower case letters to deﬁne real quantities, deﬁne  ≡ 
 The real money demand of
the household takes the form  =( 1− #)
 and similarly  +1 = #
.
We think of each ﬁnal consumption goods purchase having a random ﬁxed time
cost — perhaps, the extent to which small children are clamoring for candy in the
checkout queue — which must be borne if credit is used. This cost is known after
the customer has decided to purchase a speciﬁc amount of the product, but before
the customer has decided whether to use money or credit to ﬁnance the purchase.
Let $ (·) be the cumulative distribution function for time costs. If credit is used for
a particular good, then there are time costs % and the largest time cost is given by
¯ % = $ −1(#). Thus, total time costs are  =
R −1()
0 % $(%) The household uses
credit when its time cost is below the critical level given by $ −1 (#) and uses money
when the cost is higher.
2.1.1 Maximization Problem
Although the household’s individual state vector can be written as its holdings of
each asset ( ), it is convenient here — as in many other models — to aggregate
these assets into a measure of wealth & =  +  + −
1+	 − !.W e l e t ' be the
value function, i.e., the discounted expected lifetime utility of a household when it is
behaving optimally. The recursive maximization problem is then
' (&;





















0 ≤  +  +
 −  
1+
− ! + " = & + " (3)
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The household is assumed to view " and ! = ) as functions of the state
vector (










) discussed above and the deﬁnition &0 = 0
0 + 0
0 + 0−0
1+	0 − !. We will
return to discussion of the determinants and consequences of inﬂation later.
62.1.2 Eﬃciency conditions
We consolidate the household’s constraints (3) - (7) into a single constraint, by elim-
inating hours worked, as is conventional. We also substitute out for money, using
 =( 1−#)
 and future debt, using  0 = #
 to simplify this constraint further. Let
*, which has the economic interpretation as the shadow value of wealth, represent the
multiplier for this combined constraint. Then, we use the envelope theorem to derive
1' (&;
)=*.10 (Our notation  means the ﬁrst partial derivative of a func-































as well as (3)-(7). Condition (8) states that the marginal utility of consumption must
be equated to the full cost of consuming, which is a weighted average of the costs
of purchasing goods with currency and credit. Condition (9) equates the marginal
beneﬁto fr a i s i n g# — expanding its use of credit and decreasing its demand for money —
to its net marginal cost, which is the sum of current time cost and future repayment
cost. Condition (10) is the conventional requirement that the marginal utility of
l e i s u r ei se q u a t e dt ot h er e a lw a g er a t et i m e st h es h a d o wv a l u eo fw e a l t h .T h el a s t
two conditions specify that holdings of stocks and bonds are eﬃcient.
2.2 Retailers
We assume that retailers create units of the ﬁnal good according to a constant elas-
ticity of substitution aggregator of a continuum of intermediate products, indexed on










10We use the phrase “envelope theorem” as short-hand for analyses following Benveniste and
Scheinkman [1979], which supply derivatives of the value function under particular conditions that
ensure its diﬀerentiability.
11Note that this continuum of intermediate goods ﬁrms is distinct from the continuum of retail
outlets at which consumers purchase ﬁnal goods.
7where - is a parameter. In our economy, however, there will be groups of intermediate
goods-producing ﬁrms which will all charge the same price for their good within a
period and they can be aggregated easily. Let the .-th group have fraction / and
charge a nominal price . Then the retailer allocates its demands for intermediates


















 is the relative price of the .-th set of intermediate inputs. Retailers
view  and {}
−1
=0 as functions of 
. The nominal interest factor (1 + ) aﬀects the
retailer’s expenditures because, as is further explained below, the retailer must borrow
to ﬁnance current production. This cost minimization problem leads to intermediate







¯ ,.( 1 6 )
where , is the retailer’s supply of the composite good. Cost minimization also implies










This is the price index that we use as numeraire in the analysis above. Since the retail
sector is competitive and all goods are produced according to the same technology, it
follows that the ﬁnal goods price must satisfy  =( 1+(
)) and that the relative
price of consumption goods is given by
(
)=1+(
).( 1 8 )
Since they have no market power or specialized factors, retailers earn no proﬁts.
Hence, their market value is zero and does not enter in the household budget con-
straint. At the same time, they are borrowers, making their expenditures at t and
receiving their revenues at t+1. That is: for each unit of sales, the retail ﬁrm receives
revenues in money or credit. Each of these are cash ﬂows which are eﬀectively in date
t+1 dollars. If the ﬁrm receives money, then it must hold it “overnight.” If the ﬁrm
takes credit, then it is paid only at date t+1 with no explicit interest charges, as for
example with “credit cards” in many countries.
82.3 Intermediate goods producers
The producers of intermediate products are assumed to be monopolistic competitors
and face irregularly timed opportunities for price adjustment. For this purpose, we
use a generalized stochastic price adjustment model due to Levin [1991], as recently
exposited in Dotsey, King and Wolman’s [1999] analysis of state dependent pricing.
In this setup, a ﬁrm that has held its price ﬁxed for . periods will be permitted
to adjust with probability 1.12 With a continuum of ﬁrms, the fractions / are




Each intermediate product + on the unit interval is produced according to the
production function
2(+)=(+) (19)
with labor being paid a nominal wage rate of  and being ﬂexibly reallocated across
sectors. Nominal marginal cost for all ﬁr m si sa c c o r d i n g l y).L e t(+) ≡
()
 be
the +−th intermediate goods producer’s relative price and " = 
 , the real wage, so
that real marginal cost is 3 = ").




with the aggregate demand measure being ,(
)=
(
)+(), i.e., the sum of
household and government demand.
2.3.1 Maximization Problem
Intermediate goods ﬁrms maximize the present discounted value of their real monopoly
proﬁts given the demand structure and the stochastic structure of price adjustment.












.( 2 1 )
All ﬁrms that are adjusting at date  will choose the same nominal price, which we
call 0, which implies a relative price 0 = 0
 . The mechanical dynamics of relative
prices are simple to determine. Given that a nominal price is set at a level ,t h e n
the current relative price is  = ). If no adjustment occurs in the next period,





1+0.( 2 2 )
12This stochastic adjustment model is ﬂexible in that it contains the Taylor [1980] staggered price
adjustment model as one special case (a four-quarter model would set 1 = 2 = 3 =0and
4 =1 ), the Calvo [1983] model as another (this makes  =  for all ), and can be used to match
microeconomic data on price adjustment.
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0 = 0)(1 + 0) Af e w
comments about the form of this equation are in order. First, the discount factor used
by ﬁrms equals households’ shadow value of wealth in equilibrium, so we impose that
requirement here. Second, as is implicit in our proﬁt function, the ﬁrm is constrained
by its production function and by its demand curve, which depends on aggregate
consumption and government demand. Third, the ﬁrm knows that there are two
possible situations at date  +1 . With probability 11 it will adjust its price and the
current pricing decision will be irrelevant to its market value (0). With probability
1−11 it will not adjust its price and the current price will be maintained, resulting in
a market value (1), with the superscript . in  indicating the value of a ﬁrm which
is maintaining its price ﬁxed at the level set at date −.,i . e . , = 0
−.T h u s ,w e






















1+	0. Finally, in the last period of price ﬁxity, all ﬁrms know that they
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The optimal pricing condition (26) states that, at the optimum, a small change in
price has no eﬀect on the present discounted value. The presence of future inﬂation
reﬂects the fact that 0
1 = 0)(1 + 0), so that when the ﬁrm perturbs its relative
10price by  0, it knows that it is also changing its one period ahead relative price by

























2.4 Deﬁning the state vector s
We next consider the price component of the aggregate state vector. The natural state




these nominal prices and the current nominal price 0








1−. However, our analysis concerns (i) households and ﬁrms
that are concerned about real objectives as described above; and (ii) a monetary
authority who seeks to maximize a real objective as described below. Accordingly,
neither is concerned about the absolute level of prices in the initial period of our model
(i.e., the time at which the monetary policy rule is implemented). For this reason, we
deﬁne an alternative real state vector that captures the inﬂuence of predetermined
nominal prices, but is compatible with any initial scale of nominal prices. In this
section, we deﬁne this real state vector and describe some of its key properties. In
appendix A, we provide a detailed derivation so that future analyses of richer economic
models — containing capital, state dependent pricing and so forth — can make use of
our approach.
To begin, recall that all adjusting ﬁrms choose a relative price 0
.G i v e n t h e

































14There is a conceptual subtlety here that warrants some additional discussion. As described in
the text, we view an individual ﬁrm as choosing 
0 taking as given the actions of all other ﬁrms
— including other adjusting ﬁrms — as these aﬀect the price level, aggregate demand and so forth.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm views the actions of other adjusting ﬁrms as a function, e 
0(), with a law of
motion for  described earlier. In an equilibrium, there is a ﬁxed point in that the decision rule
of the individual ﬁrm 
0() is equal to the function e 
0(). To avoid proliferation of notation, we
simply use 
0() to capture both concepts, with the hope that this does not produce confusion.
15The state vector can alternatively be written as [0−1 0−2  0−(−1)].
11From above, we can see that variations in the price level relative to this index of lagged
nominal prices arise solely due to 0







1− = )b .
Using this indexed of lagged prices, we can express the real state of the economy
as  =( 1 −2). We choose to date this state vector as −1 to emphasize that
it is predetermined in period . These real states are relative prices — in terms of the






















for . =1 0 − 2. Their evolution is straightforward to determine; we provide



















In (32), 40 () is a function that describes the price set by adjusting ﬁrms relative
to the index of predetermined prices and 42 () describes inﬂa t i o ni nt h ei n d e xo f
predetermined prices, with these functions being derived in appendix A.17 Further,
since 
 = +1













.=1 20 − 3 (33)
Taking all of these results together, it is clear that the real state vector evolves accord-
ing to 0 = Γ(0) as discussed above, which we can now write as  = Γ(−1 0
)
Accordingly, if 0
 is a function simply of 
, this real state vector evolves according
to  = Γ(−1 0(
)) which we write as 0 = Γ(
).18
Given the real state vector, it is easy to calculate the relative prices that enter













It is also easy to calculate the nominal variables that enter into the decision problems















.( 3 5 )
16Note that we need only to include  −2 such relative prices because the the ﬁnal relative price
−1




























18Note that the household’s endogenous state variables, , 	 and 
 are not part of the aggregate
state vector since, in equilibrium,  =1and 	 − 
 =0 .
12Therefore, we may write future inﬂation as 1+(
0
) under the working assumption
that 0
 is a function only of 
.
2.5 Monetary policy
Monetary policy determines the nominal quantity of money. However, just as we
normalized other nominal variables by the index of predetermined prices, it is conve-
nient to normalize the money stock by the index of predetermined prices, and thus
to view the monetary authority as choosing the normalized money stock. With this
normalization, we denote the policy rule by M(
) and the nominal money supply
is given by
 = M(
) · b  (36)






With the general function M(
) we are not taking a stand on the targets or
instruments of monetary policy. This notation makes clear, however, that the mon-
etary authority’s optimal decisions will depend on the same set of state variables as
the decisions of the private sector.
2.6 Recursive equilibrium
We now deﬁne a recursive equilibrium in a manner that highlights the key elements
of the above analysis.20
Deﬁnition 1 For a given monetary policy function M(
),aRecursive Equilibrium






); an interest rate
function (
); a future inﬂation function (
0
); aggregate production, ,(
);d i v i -
dends,  (
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)}; retailers’ relative quantities, {, (
)}
−1
=0; intermediate goods producers’ rel-
ative prices, { (
)}
−1
=0 and a law of motion for the aggregate state 
 =( 	),
0 ∼ Υ(·), 0 = Γ(
) and 	
0 = Φ(
) such that: (i) households solve (2) - (7), (ii)
retailers solve (14) - (15), (iii) price-setting intermediate goods producers solve (22)
- (25), and (iv) markets clear.
19It is clear from (36) that if the policy rule involves no response to the state, then this generally
does not make the nominal money supply constant, because a constant M() implies  = M · b 
meaning that the path of the money supply is proportional to the path of the index of predetermined
prices. From (36), correspondingly, if the monetary authority makes the nominal money supply
constant, it must make the index of predetermined prices part of the state vector, because a constant
money supply  implies M()=b .
20The household’s real budget constraint (3) is not included in the equations that restrict equi-
librium, as in many other models, since it is implied by market clearing and the government budget
constraint. In equilibrium,  =1 , 	 − 
 =0 ,a n d  =  so that  =  +  − . Thus, current
inﬂation, , does not enter into the household’s decisions.
13A more detailed description of equilibrium is contained in appendix B. While
this deﬁnition details the elements of the discussion above that are important to
equilibrium, it is useful to note that a positive analysis of this equilibrium can be
carried out without determining the value functions ' (·) and { (·)}
−1
=0, but by
simply relying on the ﬁrst-order conditions. We exploit this feature in our analysis of
optimal policy, which is the topic that we turn to next.
3 Optimal policy
Our analysis of optimal policy is in the tradition of Ramsey [1927] and draws heavily
on the modern literature on optimal policy in dynamic economies which follows from
Lucas and Stokey [1983]. In this paper, as in King and Wolman [1999], we adapt this
approach to an economy which has real and nominal frictions. Here those frictions
are monopolistic competition, price stickiness and the costly conversion of wealth
into goods, with the cost aﬀected by money holding. The outline of our multi-stage
approach is as follows. First, we have already determined the eﬃciency conditions of
households and ﬁrms that restrict dynamic equilibria, as well as the various budget
and resource constraints. Second, we manipulate these equations to determine a
smaller subset of restrictions that govern key variables, in particular eliminating )b 
so that it is clear that we are not taking a stand on the monetary instrument. Third,
we maximize expected utility subject to these constraints, which yields constrained
optimal allocations. Fourth, we ﬁnd the absolute prices and monetary policy actions
which lead these outcomes to be the result of dynamic equilibrium.21
For the purpose of this section, it is convenient to deﬁne a set of ratio variables,
5
 ≡ 2
),. From the above analysis of demand, it is clear that these ratio variables




. Using this deﬁnition, it is possible to de-
scribe a real policy problem restricted by production technology and implementation
constraints. The staggered nature of pricing makes it a dynamic real policy problem,
which contains restrictions on the motion of real state variables and forward-looking
implementation constraints on states and controls.
3.1 Organizing the restrictions on dynamic equilibria
We begin by organizing the equations of section 2 so that they are a set of mainly
r e a lc o n s t r a i n t so nt h ep o l i c ym a k e r . T oa i di nt h i sp r o c e s sa n di nt h es t a t e m e n t
of the optimal monetary policy problem as an inﬁnite horizon dynamic optimization
problem in the next subsection, it becomes useful to reintroduce time subscripts
throughout this section.
21We do not consider the possibility that optimal policy might involve randomization, as suggested
by Bassetto [1999] and Dupor [2002].
143.1.1 Restrictions implied by technology and relative demand
The ﬁrst constraint is associated with production. Since  =
P−1
=0 /






 + ).( 3 7 )
The second constraint is associated with the aggregator (13), which applies to retailing










3.1.2 Restrictions implied by state dynamics
With staggered pricing, we previously showed that  =( 1 −2) evolved ac-
cording to (32) and (33). Previously, we represented these 0 − 2 equations as
 = Γ(−1 0
). Using the fact that 50
 =( 0
)−, there is a simple linkage be-
tween 50
 and the motion of real states.
3.1.3 Restrictions implied by household behavior
The household’s decision rules are implicitly restricted by the equations (3) - (7)
and (8) - (12). A planner must respect all of these conditions, but it is convenient
for us to use some of them to reduce the number of choice variables, while retaining
others. In particular, combining (8), (11) and (18), we ﬁnd that the household requires
that the marginal utility of consumption is equated to a measure of the full price of
consumption, which depends on * as is conventional, but also on  and # because
money or credit must be used to obtain consumption.
1(
 )=* [1 +  (1 − #)] (39)
Combining (9), (11) and (18), the eﬃcient choice between money and credit as a









which indicates how credit use is related to market prices and quantities.22
The nominal interest rate enters into each of these equations but, since it is an





1+	+1]. We manipulate this equation to make more
22Since  =1− 
, this is also restriction that implicitly deﬁnes the demand for money, 
,a sa
function of a small number of variables, i.e., 
 =1−(

 ). We exploit this in our analysis below.
15transparent the constraints that it places on real variables. In particular, multiplying
through by 0 = 1













which is a forward-looking constraint, reﬂecting the intertemporal nature of (11).
Combining equations (4) and (5) to eliminate transactions time, we can write
 =1−  −
Z −1()
0
% $ (%)=(#).( 4 2 )
so that only  and # are choices for the optimal policy problem.
We do not drop the other household conditions, but rather use them to construct
variables which do not enter directly in the optimal policy problem, but are relevant
for the decentralization, such as real money demand as  =( 1 −#)
 = (
 #)
and real transactions debt as  +1 = #
 =  (
 #).
3.1.4 Restrictions implied by ﬁrm behavior
Price-setting behavior of intermediate good producers is captured by the form of





















We rewrite this expression by multiplying both sides by *
, transforming (26) -
(29) to expressions of the form
0=6(50





















  *   ).( 4 5 )
where (44) holds for . =1 20 − 2,w h e r e
6(5
  *   )=( 
 + )
µ

























Note that the function 6(5
  *   ) is simply shorthand that makes the ex-
pressions look neater. By contrast, the variables 7
 actually replace the expression
(1 − 1)*1(
)
3.2 The optimal policy problem
The monetary policy authority maximizes (1) subject to the constraints just derived,
including a number of constraints which introduce expectations of future variables
into the time  constraint set. One way to proceed is to deﬁne a Lagrangian for the
dynamic optimization problem, with the result being displayed in Table 1. In this La-
grangian, d is a vector of decisions that includes real quantities, some other elements
and the nominal interest rate  Similarly, Λ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers




=1 as given. Finally, it embeds the various deﬁnitions above, including
6(5

  *   ) etc.
In Table 1, there are two types of constraints to which we attach multipliers. The
ﬁrst three lines correspond to the forward-looking constraints: (41), which is a kind
of Fisher equation, and (43) - (45), which are the implementation constraints arising
from dynamic monopoly pricing. We stress these constraints by listing them ﬁrst in
Table 1 and in other tables below. The remainder are conventional constraints which
either describe point-in-time restrictions on the planner’s choices or the evolution of
the real state variables that the planner controls.
One can then ﬁnd the ﬁrst order conditions to this complicated dynamic opti-
mization problem. Because the problem is dynamic and has fairly large dimension
at each date, there are many such conditions. Further, as is well-known since the
work of Kydland and Prescott [1977], this problem is inherently nonstationary. As
an example of this aspect of the policy problem, consider the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to 7 for some . satisfying 0 8.80−1 which would arise if uncertainty












Notice that the diﬀerence between these two expressions is the presence of a lagged
multiplier, so that they would be identical if 	−1
−1 were added to the right-hand
side of the former.
173.2.1 Augmenting the optimal policy problem
We now augment the policy problem with a full set of lagged multipliers, correspond-
ing to the forward-looking constraints. In doing so, we generalize the Lagrangian to
that displayed in Table 2, eﬀectively making the problem stationary.











 *. By contrast,
the *0 does not have the ﬁrst term. To make the ﬁrst order conditions time invariant,




0*0, which introduces the lagged multiplier 9−1 into our
problem.
Implementation constraints arising from intermediate goods pricing (43 - 45):
There are a number of implications of the constraints involving optimal price-setting
b yt h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sﬁrms.
First, 71
 typically appears in period  − 1 as (−1	0
−171





. The exception is 71
0 which does not have the ﬁrst term. We therefore
append the term, 	0
−171
0 to the optimization problem, which introduces another
lagged multiplier, 	0
−1.
Second, for each . =2 0−2, 7







. Again, an exception is 7
0 which does not have the ﬁrst term.
We add these terms, 	−1
−17










. As above, an exception is 7−1
0 which does not have the ﬁrst term.
We add the term 	−2
−17−1
0 to our problem, and hence introduce the lagged
multiplier 	−2
−1.





=0] all to 0,t h e nw eh a v ee x a c t l yt h e
same problem as before. Accordingly, we can always ﬁnd the solution to the Table
1 problem from the Table 2 problem. However, the explicit introduction of these
variables allows us to now examine a fully recursive formulation of the problem, as
we explain next.
B e f o r et u r n i n gt ot h i st o p i c ,w en o t et h a ti nT a b l e2w ed e ﬁne '∗(−1	 −10)






=0]. As is familiar from the static context of static optimization, this
value function for the optimal policy problem has two important properties. First, it
depends on the parameters of the problem, which here are −1	 −10. Second, it is
the solution to the problem of maximizing the objective (1) subject to the constraints
discussed above, so we use the notation '∗ to denote the planner’s value function.
3.2.2 The recursive form of the policy problem
Working on optimal capital taxation under commitment, Kydland and Prescott [1980]
began the analysis of how to solve such problems using recursive methods. They
18proposed augmenting the traditional state vector with a lagged multiplier as above
and then described a dynamic programming approach. Important recent work by
Marcet and Marimon [1999] formally develops the general theory necessary for a
recursive approach to such problems.
In our context, the fully recursive form of the policy problem is displayed in
Table 3. There are a number of features to point out. First, the state vector for





=0].T h a t i s :w e
have now determined the extra state variables to which the monetary authority was
viewed as responding in section 2 above. Second, we can write the optimal policy
problem in a recursive form similar to a Bellman equation; Marcet and Marimon
[1999] describe such a recursive form as a saddlepoint functional equation. Third, as
('∗(	 9 +1) summarizes the future eﬀects of current choices, there is a dramatic
simpliﬁcation of the problem, with future constraints eliminated, as is a conventional
beneﬁt of employing dynamic programming.
3.3 FOCs, Steady States, and Linearization
Given this particular recursive form, it is a straightforward activity—if a somewhat
lengthy one—to determine the ﬁrst order conditions that circumscribe optimal policy.
As in conventional dynamic programs, these ﬁrst order conditions can involve the
derivatives of the future value function (i.e., the derivatives of '∗(	 9 +1))w i t h
respect to elements of  or 	. Application of the conventional envelope theorem
method supplies these necessary derivatives. As with other dynamic programs, the
ﬁrst order conditions may be represented as a system of equations of the form
0=({F(: +1:;+1;)}
where :  is the vector of all endogenous states, multipliers, and decisions and ;









=0  −1	 −1]0 and ; =[  ]0.
Our computational approach involves two steps. First, we calculate a stationary
point deﬁned by F(: :;;)=0 . Second, we then (log)linearize the above system
and calculate the local dynamic behavior of quantities and prices given a speciﬁed
law of motion for the exogenous states , which is also taken to be (log)linear.
3.4 Real and nominal aspects of the policy problem
The approach of Lucas and Stokey [1983] is to formulate the optimal policy problem
entirely in terms of real quantities, but our analysis above stops short of fully utilizing
this approach. There are two elements that are incomplete in this regard. First, in our
formulation of the policy problem, the initial real state −1 was described as a vector
of relative prices. We also showed how the evolution of the state was determined by
19the ratio of real quantities 50
 Alternatively one can interpret the initial state as a



















. =1 0 − 2
While this interpretation helps make it possible to express the policy problem in our
model entirely in terms of real quantities, it seems more natural in the staggered
pricing environment to view the initial state as involving relative prices rather than
relative quantities.25
Second, we have left the nominal interest rate  and the marginal utility of wealth
* in the our formulation of the optimal policy problem, although these variables can
be eliminated to produce an entirely real problem.26 However, we have chosen not do
so in order to let us more readily analyze the consequences of variations in nominal
interest rates on economic activity and welfare in this work and in future research.
4F o u r d i s t o r t i o n s
Our macroeconomic model has the property that there are four readily identiﬁable
routes by which nominal factors can aﬀect real economic activity.
4.1 Deﬁning the distortions
We discuss these four distortions in turn, using general ideas that carry over to a
wider class of macroeconomic models.
Relative price distortions: In any model with asynchronized adjustment of nom-
inal prices, there are distortions that arise when the price level is not constant. In

















1− since (i)  = −1−1; and (ii) the
index of lagged prices is homogeneous of degree one. The expression in the text then follows directly
from the deﬁnition of −1.
25However, the results are insensitive to which interpretation one prefers.
26Using (39) and (40), one ﬁnds that  (!" )=[ 1#(!" ) − (1 − )2#(!" )−1 ()!]
and $(!" )=
2()−1()
[1()−(1−)2()−1()]] These functions then can be imposed on the
planning problem, with   and $ eliminated as choice variables and the last two terms in Tables 1
and 2 eliminated.
20If all relative prices are unity, then = takes on a value of one. If relative prices deviate
from unity, which is the unconstrained eﬃcient level given the technology, then =
measures the extent of lost aggregate output which arises for this reason.
The markup distortion: If all ﬁrms have the same marginal cost functions, then we
can write  = Ψ Here  is the nominal wage, Ψ is nominal marginal cost and
 is the common marginal product of labor. If we divide by the perfect (intermediate
good) price index, then this expression can be stated in real terms as




so that real marginal cost 3 acts like a sales tax shifter.
Some recent literature has described this second source of distortions in terms
of the average markup > ≡ )Ψ,w h i c hi st h er e c i p r o c a lo fr e a lm a r g i n a lc o s t3,
stressing that the monetary authority has temporary control over this markup tax
because prices are sticky, enabling it to erode (or enhance) the markups of ﬁrms with
sticky prices.27 According to this convention, which we follow here, a higher value of
the markup lowers real marginal cost and works like a tax on productive activity.
Since movements in = and > (or 3) are not necessarily related closely together,
it is best to think about these two factors from the standpoint of ﬁscal analysis —
in which there can be separate shocks to the level of the production function and
its marginal products — rather than reasoning from the eﬀects of productivity shocks
which traditionally shift both in RBC analysis.
Ineﬃcient shopping time: The next distortion is sometimes referred to as “shoe
leather costs.” But in our model, it is really “shopping time costs,” as in McCallum
and Goodfriend [1988], since it is in time rather than goods units. In (42) above,
it is  =
R −1()
0 % $ (%). Variations in  work like a shock to the economy’s
time endowment. Pursuing the ﬁscal analogy discussed above, this is similar to a
conscription (lump sum labor tax).
The wedge of monetary ineﬃciency: In transactions-based monetary models,
there is also an eﬀect of monetary policy on the full cost of consumption. In (39)
above, it is 1(
 )=* [1 +  (1 − #)]. This equation highlights as a wedge
of monetary ineﬃciency the product of the nominal interest rate and the extent of
monetization of exchange (1−#). Pursuing the ﬁscal policy analogy discussed above,
it is like a consumption tax relative to the non-monetary model.
4.2 Selectively eliminating one or more distortions
Since the four distortions all enter into our model, it can be diﬃcult to determine
which distortion is giving rise to a particular result. In our analysis below, we selec-
tively eliminate one or more distortions. In doing so, we are imagining that there is
a ﬁscal authority which can oﬀset the distortions in the following ways.
27See Woodford [1995], King and Wolman [1996] and Goodfriend and King [1997].
21Eliminating variations in relative price distortions. This modiﬁcation involves re-
solving the model with = (
 + )= replacing = (
 + )=.S i n c er e l a t i v e
price distortions aﬀect the constraint = (
 + )= but do not aﬀect the marginal
costs of ﬁrms or the wages of workers, they can be interpreted as an additive pro-
ductivity shock—relative to a benchmark level of =—with an eﬀect of (1)= −1)=).
Accordingly, the elimination of relative price distortions can be understood as involv-




where = is a benchmark level of distortions with = =1corresponding to no distortions.
Total government spending would then be  − e 
Eliminating variation in the markup distortion. This involves re-solving the model
with " = 3 replacing " = 3 = 1
. Using the idea that the markup is like a
sales tax, we can think of this as involving a ﬁscal authority which adjusts an explicit
sales/subsidy tax on intermediate goods producers so that (1+!
) 1
 =( 1+!),w h e r e
(1 + !)=3 is a benchmark level of the net tax on intermediate goods producers
from the two sources.
Eliminating variations in ineﬃcient shopping time. Eliminating variations in the
resources used by credit involves holding the right hand side of  + =1− ﬁxed.
A ﬁscal interpretation of this is that a ﬁscal authority varies the amount of its lump
sum conﬁscation of time similarly to the changes in lump sum conﬁscation of goods
discussed for relative price distortions.
Eliminating variations in the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency. This modiﬁcation
involves holding (1 + (1 − #)) ﬁxed at a speciﬁed level. A ﬁscal interpretation is
that there is a consumption tax rate which is varied so that (1 + (1 − #))(1 + !
)
is held constant at a speciﬁed level.
4.3 Distortions under “neutral” policy
One possible choice for the monetary authority of real outcomes is sometimes de-
scribed as neutral policy, as in Goodfriend and King [1997]. It involves making the
path of the price level constant through time, thus minimizing relative price distor-
tions but leaving the markup at > = 
−1 and allowing variations in the two monetary
distortions as the real economy ﬂuctuates over time in response to variations in the
real conditions  and . Under this regime, real activity ﬂuctuates in a manner
which is identical to how it would behave if prices were ﬂexible and if the monetary
authority stabilized the price level. In its essence, this is the Fisherian proposal for
eliminating business ﬂuctuations via price stabilization.
A tl e a s ta f t e rab r i e fs t a r t u pp e r i o da s s o c i a t e dw i t hw o r k i n go ﬀ an inherited
distribution of relative prices , such an outcome is always feasible for the monetary
authority in our economy. To the extent that the monetary authority chooses to
depart from these neutral outcomes, it is because it is responding to the distortions
identiﬁed in this section. For one example, a monetary authority might choose a
lower average rate of inﬂation, to reduce time costs, as suggested by Friedman. For
22another example, a monetary authority might choose to stabilize the ﬂuctuations in
real economic activity that would occur under neutral policy, changing the extent to
which the markup distortion is present in booms and contractions. Such stabilization
policy would be of the general form advocated by Keynes.
5 Choice of parameters
Given the limited amount of existing research on optimal monetary policy using the
approach of this paper and given the starkness of our model economy, we have chosen
the parameters with two objectives in mind. First, we want our economy to be as
realistic as possible, so we calibrate certain parameters to match certain features of
the U.S. economy as discussed below. Second, we want our economy to be familiar
to economists who have worked with related models of business cycles, ﬁscal policy,
money demand, and sticky prices. Our benchmark parametric model is as follows,
with the time unit taken to be one quarter of a year.
5.1 Preferences
We assume the utility function is logarithmic, (
)=l n 
 +3 3ln(),w i t ht h e
parameter set so that agents work approximately .20 of available time. We assume
also that the discount factor is such that the annual interest rate would be slightly
less than three percent ( =0 9928). This choice of the discount factor is governed
by data on one year T-bill rates and the GDP deﬂator.
5.2 Monopoly power
We assume that the demand elasticity, -, is 10. This means that the markup would be
11.11% over marginal cost if prices were ﬂexible. Hall [1988] argues for much higher
markups, whereas Basu and Fernald [1997] argue for somewhat lower markups. Our
choice of - =1 0is representative of other recent work.on monopolistically competitive
macroeconomic models; e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford [1999] use - =7 88.W ea l s o
explore the implications of a lower elasticity of demand (higher markup).
5.3 Distribution of price-setters
A key aspect of our economy is the extent of exogenously imposed price stickiness.
We use a distribution suggested by Wolman [1999], which has the following features.
First, it implies that ﬁrms expected a newly set price to remain in eﬀect for ﬁve
quarters. That is: the expected duration of a price chosen at ,w h i c hi s111+( 1−
11)122+( 1− 11)(1 − 12)133+ is equal to 5. Second, this estimate is consistent
with the recent empirical work on aggregate price adjustment dynamics by Gali and
Gertler [1999] and Sbordone [2002]. Third, rather than assuming a constant hazard
231 = 1 as in the Calvo [1983] model, our weights involve an increasing hazard, which
is consistent with available empirical evidence and recent work on models of state
dependent pricing. The particular adjustment probabilities 1 and the associated
distribution are given in Table 4; the average age of prices is
P−1
=0 ./ =2 3 for
the benchmark parameterization. We explore some implications of assuming greater
price ﬂexibility below
5.4 Credit costs and money demand
Our model establishes a direct link between the distribution of credit costs and the









embodies the negative eﬀect of the interest rate and the positive eﬀect of a scale
variable — consumption expenditure — stressed in the transactions models of Baumol
[1952] and Tobin [1956] as well as the positive eﬀe c to ft h ew a g er a t es t r e s s e db y
D u t t o na n dG r a m m[ 1 9 7 3 ] . T h a ti s ,t h ef r a c t i o no fg o o d sp u r c h a s e dw i t hc r e d i ti s
higher when the interest cost 
 i sg r e a t e ro rw h e nt h ew a g er a t e" is lower: the ratio

)" is the time value of interest foregone by holding money to buy consumption.
5.4.1 Estimating the demand for money
We use the following procedure to estimate the demand for money. First, we posit





for 0 86≤ 5. The basic building block of this distribution is the beta distribution,
2 = (;1 2), which maps from the unit interval for  into the unit interval for 2.
It is a ﬂexible functional form in that the parameters 1 2 c a nb eu s e dt oa p p r o x -
imate a wide range of distributions.28 In the general expression (50), we allow for
the standard beta-distribution’s independent variable to be replaced by 6)5,w h i c h
essentially changes the support of the distribution of costs to (05). In addition, we
make it possible for some goods to be pure cash or pure credit goods: # is a mass
point at zero credit costs, allowing for the possibility that there are some goods that
will always be purchased with credit; # ≤ 1 − # similarly allows for goods for which
m o n e yw i l la l w a y sb eu s e d .
28See, for example, Casella and Berger [1990], pages 107-108, for a discussion of the beta dis-
tribution. The beta cdf takes the form [
R 
0 ()1−1(1 − )2−1
]%(	1	 2),w h e r e%(	1	 2)=
Γ(	1)Γ(	2)[Γ(	1 + 	2)] is the % function, which is in turn based on the Γ function as shown.
24We use quarterly economic data to construct empirical analogues to our model’s
variables: a measure of the nominal stock of currency; a measure of nominal con-
sumption expenditures per capita; a measure of the nominal interest rate; and a
measure of the hourly nominal wage rate.29 The ratios 
 and (
  ) are shown in
Figure 1.30 Since there is not too much low frequency variation in ( 
 ),t h eF i g u r e
mainly reﬂects the fact that the velocity of money and the nominal interest rate move
together. Figure 1 highlights the fact that we explore two sample periods. First, we
look at the sample 1948.1 through 1989.4. Our choice of the endpoint of this “long
sample” is based on evidence that an increasing portion of currency was held outside
of the U.S. during the 1990s.31 The key feature of this longer sample period is that
there is an initial interval of low nominal interest rates which makes the opportu-
nity cost of money holding (
)") quite low. Second, we look at 1959.1-1989.4 since
some analysts have argued that the earlier period is no longer relevant for U.S. money
demand behavior.
Two estimated money demand functions are displayed in Figure 1, one for the
shorter sample and one for the longer sample. Each money demand function is
estimated by selecting the parameters [##51 2] so as to minimize the sum of
squared deviations between the model and the data.32
5.4.2 Implications of the money demand estimates.
We stress three implications of the money demand estimates.
The estimated cost distribution: The parameter estimates over the two sample
periods also imply distributions of credit costs, which are displayed in panel A of
Figure 2. The ﬁrst point to note is that the two costs cdfs are very similar for
opportunity cost measures exceeding .002, as were the money demand functions in
29The basic data used is a three month treasury bill rate; the FRB St. Louis’s currency series;
real personal consumption expenditures (billions of chained 1996 dollars); the personal consumption
expenditures series chain-type price index (1996=100); civilian noninstitutional population and av-
erage hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing. The ratio ! is formed by taking
the ratio of currency to nominal consumption expenditures, which is itself a product of real expen-
ditures and the data. The ratio $! is formed by multiplying the quarterly nominal treasury bill
rate by nominal per capita consumption expenditures and then dividing by nominal average hourly
earnings.
30The wage rate in the model is a wage per quarter, with the quantity of time normalized to one.
The wage rate in the data is an hourly wage rate. Assuming that the time endowment per quarter is
16 hours per day, 7 days per week and 13 weeks per quarter, there are then 1456 hours per quarter.
We therefore divide the data series $! by this number of hours to get a measure that conforms
to the theory.
31See Porter and Judson [1996].
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25Figure 1. Below this point, the two functions diﬀer substantially. The short sample
period suggests that there are many goods (about two-thirds) that have zero credit
costs. The longer sample period suggests that there are many more goods with small,
but non-neglible transactions costs.
This ﬁgure anticipates the results presented below, by indicating not only the
lowest interest rate data point as ‘o’ but also the optimal level of the nominal interest
rate as ‘*’. For the short sample, the optimal nominal interest rate happens to be
virtually identical to the minimum value in the sample, while for the longer sample
the optimum is slightly above the minimum value.
The money demand elasticities: Given the cost distribution (50), there is not a
single “money demand elasticity.” But we can still compute the relevant elasticity
at each point, producing panel B of Figure 2. For the long sample period, the money
demand elasticity is less (in absolute value) than one-half, and for the short sample
period, it is less than one-third. The triangle in panel B indicates the money demand
elasticity at the mean interest rate for the sample in question.
Bailey-Friedman calculations. Positive nominal interest rates lead individuals in
this model to spend time in credit transactions activity that could be avoided if
the nominal interest rate were zero. Given the estimated money demand function,
with its associated distribution of credit costs, we can calculate this time cost as
 =
R ( )
0 % $(%), which is the area under the inverse money demand function.33
If all goods were purchased with credit, the short (long) sample money demand
estimates imply that individuals would spend approximately 0.03% (0.05%) of their
time endowment in credit transactions.34
6 Optimal policy in the long run
There are two natural reference points for thinking about optimal policy in the long
run. The ﬁrst reference point is Friedman’s [1969] celebrated conclusion that the
nominal interest rate should be suﬃciently close to zero so that the private and social
33The “generalized beta” distribution makes this a particularly simple calculation because the
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34While this number may seem implausibly small to some readers, reference to Figures 1 and 2
helps understand why it is not given our transactions demand for money. As seen in Figure 1, the
largest amount of credit use — implying a rate of money to consumption of about .25 — begins to
take place when the opportunity cost is about .005, which translates to annualized interest rate of
just under 10% as seen in Figure 2. With the estimated money demand over the short sample,
the money demand curve cuts the axis at less than ! = 4, implying an increase in ! of
15 = 4 − 25. Using a triangle to approximate the integral, we ﬁnd that the approximate cost
saving is 1
2(005) ∗ 15 = 000375 or .0375%.
26costs of money-holding coincide. At this point, the economy minimizes the costs of
decentralized exchange. The second reference point is an average rate of inﬂation of
zero, which minimizes relative price distortions in steady state. In this section, we
document the intuitive conclusion that the long-run inﬂation rate should be negative
— but not as negative as suggested by Friedman’s analysis — when both sticky price
and exchange frictions are present.
6.1 The four distortions at zero inﬂation
If there is zero inﬂation in the benchmark economy—which uses the credit cost tech-
nology with parameters set from the short sample estimates—then it is relatively easy
to determine the levels of the four distortions. With zero inﬂation, the nominal and
real interest rates are each equal to 2.93 percent per annum. The parameters of the
credit cost technology imply that 65.6 percent of transactions are ﬁnanced with credit
(# = 656) and that the ratio of real money to consumption is about 34 percent.
The markup is equal to that which prevails in the static monopoly problem, > =

−1 =1 11 so that price is roughly eleven percent higher than real marginal cost in
the steady-state.
There are no relative price distortions —a l lﬁrms are charging the same, unchang-
i n gp r i c e—s ot h a t= =1 . Further, marginal relative price distortions are also small.
The wedge of monetary ineﬃciency is positive, but relatively small in this steady
state. It is calculated from the above discussion as
(1 + (1 − #) ∗ )=( 1+( 1− 656) ∗ 0072) = 10025
where the calculation of the wedge uses the quarterly nominal interest rate 0072.
Time costs associated with use of credit are quite small, approximately .004%
of the time endowment. Recall that the maximal time costs - associated with using
credit for all purchases - are about 0.03%. At zero inﬂation, time spent on credit
transactions involves only 14% of the maximum time that could be spent on credit
transactions.
6.2 The benchmark result on long-run inﬂation
Even though the distortions associated with money demand are small at zero inﬂation,
a monetary authority maximizing steady-state welfare would nonetheless choose a
lower rate of inﬂation, for the reasons stressed by Friedman [1969]. When we solve
the optimal policy problem for the benchmark model using the short-sample estimates
displayed in Figure 1 above, we ﬁnd that the asymptotic rate of inﬂation — the steady
state under the optimal policy — is negative 76 basis points (−076% at an annual
rate). Given that we assume a steady-state real interest rate of 293% percent (as
determined by time preference), the long-run rate of nominal interest is 217%.
27This result raises two sets of questions. First, how do the four distortions isolated
earlier in the paper contribute to this ﬁnding? Second, how do variations away from
the benchmark parameter values aﬀect the optimal long-run inﬂation rate? Each of
these questions is addressed in Table 5 and in the discussion below.
6.3 Optimal inﬂa t i o nw i t hf e w e rd i s t o r t i o n s
We now alter the monetary authority’s problem — relative to the benchmark case —
by selectively eliminating one or more distortions. Table 5 shows the eﬀect of various
modiﬁcations of the mix of distortions.35
Why is disinﬂation desirable? Starting with the zero inﬂation steady-state
rate of inﬂation, the Table shows that both the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency and
time costs play a role in reducing the inﬂation rate from zero to the benchmark
level of -.76%. Table 5 shows that the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency has a moderate
inﬂu e n c eo nt h eo p t i m a ll o n g - r u nr a t eo fi n ﬂation. If it is eliminated by itself, then
the inﬂation rate rises from -.76% to -.54%, so that the wedge accounts for almost
30% of the deviation from zero inﬂation. It also shows that if we only eliminate time
costs, then the inﬂation rate rises further, from -.76% to -.28%, so that time costs
alone account for almost 65% of the deviation from the zero inﬂation position.36
Why is there less deﬂa t i o nt h a na tt h eF r i e d m a nR u l e ? If prices are
ﬂexible, then the Friedman rule is optimal even though there is imperfect competition.
In fact, Goodfriend [1997] notes that a positive markup makes the case stronger in a
sense because the additional labor supply induced by declines in the wedge and time
costs yield a social marginal product of labor which exceeds the real wage.
To evaluate why there is a benchmark rate of inﬂa t i o no f- . 7 6 %p e ra n n u m—a s
opposed to a Friedman rule level of -2.93% per annum — it is necessary to eliminate
variations in either the relative price distortion or the markup distortion. We suppose
that the markup distortion is ﬁxed at the zero inﬂation level, i.e., > = −1
 =1 11.I n
this case, Table 2 shows that there is a slightly more negative rate of inﬂation than
with a variable markup, a ﬁnding which is consistent with the facts that in this model,
the average markup (i) is decreasing in the inﬂation rate near zero inﬂation; and (ii)
does not respond importantly to variations in the inﬂation rate near zero inﬂation.
The ﬁrst fact explains why eliminating the distortion makes the optimal inﬂation
rate more negative, since the monetary authority does not encounter an increasing
markup in the modiﬁe dp r o b l e ma si tl o w e r st h ei n ﬂation rate from a starting point
of zero. The second fact explains why the eﬀect is a small one quantitatively.
35The table also presents results of the sensitivity analysis to be discussed below.
36Time costs and the wedge interact nonlinearly in determining the long run inﬂation rate. There-
fore, adding up the contributions of the two eﬀects in isolation does not yield the long run inﬂation
rate from the benchmark case with both eﬀects present.
286.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We now explore the sensitivity of the steady-state rate of inﬂation to two aspects of
the model. First, holding the parameters of money demand ﬁxed at the benchmark
levels, we explore the consequences of various structural features of the model. These
results are presented in panel A of Table 5. Second, we discuss the long-run rate
of inﬂation using the parameter estimates from the long sample. These results are
presented in panel B of Table 5.
6.4.1 Changing features of the model
We explore the consequences of changing the degree of monopoly power and the
extent of price stickiness.
Monopoly power: Decreasing the demand elasticity (-)t o6l e a d st oal a r g e rd e ﬂa-
tion, 134% per year, because this lowers the costs of relative price distortions. The
money demand distortions become relatively more important, pushing the optimum
closer to the Friedman rule.
Price stickiness: we change the distribution of prices (/) to [030280250201].
With this distribution, the expected duration of a newly adjusted price is 38 quar-
ters. The inﬂation rate in the long run under optimal policy is −12%. Optimal policy
comes closer to the Friedman rule in this case because the relative price distortions
associated with deviations from zero inﬂation are smaller the more ﬂexible are prices.
6.4.2 Credit costs based on the long sample
If we solve the optimal policy problem with the longer sample estimates, Panel B
shows that there is much more deﬂation, reﬂecting the increased gains from substi-
tution away from costly credit at low interest rates. The asymptotic rate of deﬂation
is −230%, implying a nominal interest rate of only 0.63%. The other structural
features continue to aﬀect the long-run inﬂation rate in the manner described above.
7 Dynamics under optimal policy
We now discuss the nature of the dynamic response of the macroeconomy under opti-
mal policy. The reference point for this discussion is the response of real quantities if
prices are ﬂexible and there are no money demand distortions. After discussing this
case, we begin by studying optimal policy response in a situation in which there are
distortions from imperfect competition and sticky prices, but there are no money de-
mand distortions. We contrast the eﬀects of shocks to productivity and demand. We
then turn to analyzing the eﬀects of these same shocks when the monetary authority
is confronted with money demand distortions as well.
297.1 The real business cycle solution
If intermediate goods ﬁrms have market power but can ﬂexibly adjust their prices and
if there are no money demand distortions, then the loglinear approximation dynamics
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This real business cycle (RBC) solution is the benchmark for our subsequent analy-
sis. We study impulse responses to productivity and government purchase shocks,
under the assumption that each is ﬁrst order autoregressive with a parameter @ Under
this assumption, all of the macro variables in the RBC solution have simple solutions.
For example, assuming that log())=@log(−1))+A!, the impulse response of




that of the real interest rate is just ? − ? = !
!−"(@ − 1)@A!.S i n c e @81,t h er e a l
interest rate is low when the level of consumption is high, because consumption is
expected to fall back to its stationary level.
7.2 Optimal policy without money demand distortions
In this section, we explore dynamic responses to productivity and government demand
shocks in variants of our model with the money demand distortions eliminated, which
is the case previously studied in King and Wolman [1999]. Our procedure is to make
two uses of the ﬁrst order conditions from the optimal policy problem.38 First, we
solve these conditions for a stationary point, which is the long run limit that will occur
under optimal policy. Second, we study the response to shocks near this stationary
point, working also under the assumption that these shocks occur in the stationary
distribution that obtains under optimal policy. 39
37Derivation of approximate dynamics is facilitated by recognizing that without money demand or
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38Above, we wrote the planner’s ﬁrst order conditions as 0=,{F(- +1-.+1.)}.T h e
ﬁrst step involves ﬁnding 0=F(- -..). The second step involves solving the linear rational
expectations model near this stationary point and computing the response of the policy authority.
39Technically, we compute the optimal policy response with the initial vector of lagged multipliers
taking on its steady-state value.
30Without money demand distortions, the long run limit involves a zero inﬂation
steady state. One focal point of our discussion, here and below, in on the response
of the price level to our two shocks under optimal policy.
7.2.1 Productivity shocks
Figure 3 displays the response of economic activity under optimal policy when there
are persistent variations in productivity (the autoregressive coeﬃcient is set equal to
.95). For the purpose of discussing this ﬁgure and the others below, we use the RBC
solution as the reference point. Optimal policy here is to exactly replicate the RBC
solution for quantities and this involves holding the path of the price level exactly
constant through time.
Turning to the details of the graph, it is constructed under the assumption that
there are no government purchases in the steady state, so that consumption moves
one-for-one with the productivity shock and labor is predicted to be constant. The
level of the productivity shock is 1.0% and the expected growth rate of consumption
at date 0 is then (@−1) = −05. We state the real interest rate in annualized terms,
so that the impact eﬀect on the real and nominal interest rate is −20 or a decline of
20 basis points relative to the steady-state level of the rate.
In this setting, then, there is no Keynesian stabilization policy: the government
does not choose to smooth out the ﬂuctuations that would occur if prices were ﬂexible,
even though there are monopoly distortions present in the economy which make
output ineﬃciently low. At the same time, in order to bring about this ﬂexible price
solution, it is necessary for policy to be activist. For example, if the interest rate is
the policy instrument, then it must move with the underlying determinants of the
real interest rate.
7.2.2 Government purchase shocks
Figure 4 displays the response of economic activity under optimal policy when there
are persistent variations in government purchases (the autoregressive coeﬃcient is
again set equal to .95). In this setting, the response of economic activity deviates
from the ﬂexible price solution, in a manner that is particularly evident in the path
of interest rates.
Under the RBC solution, the basic mechanism is that there is a persistent, but
ultimately temporary, drain on the economy’s resources. In response to this drain,
the representative agent consumes fewer market goods and takes less leisure, so that
work eﬀort rises. The real interest rate again reﬂects the response of consumption
growth: it rises because consumption is expected to grow back toward the steady
state as the government purchase shock disappears.
Under optimal policy, this basic picture is overlaid with an initial interval dur-
ing which labor input and consumption are reduced relative to the levels that would
31prevail if prices were ﬂexible. There is an important sense in which this is counterin-
tuitive from a traditional perspective on stabilization policy: the monetary authority
works to increase the variability of consumption stemming from a real shock rather
than mitigate it. Working with pre-set pricing model of the sort developed by Ireland
[1996] and Adao, Correia and Teles [2001], Goodfriend and King [2001] argue that
the key to understanding the eﬀects of government purchases is to recognize that
optimal policy selects a state contingent pattern of consumption taking into account
its inﬂuence on the contingent claims price *(
)=1(
).40 Relative to the RBC
solution, the government will want to have less consumption when government pur-
chases are high because this increases the contingent claims value of , making it
easier to satisfy the implementation constraint. Our staggered pricing model displays
a similar incentive, but a dynamic one: the monetary authority wants to depress the
consumption path to an extent while there are predetermined prices. In line with this,
Figure 4 shows that the optimal plan involves consumption which is transitorily low
relative to the RBC solution. Because consumption is expected to grow toward the
RBC path in these periods, the real interest rate — which continues to be described by




)]—is high relative to the RBC path. The magnitude
of this interest rate variation is substantial relative to the RBC component, because
there is a temporary initial consumption shortfall, which implies rapid growth.
In our setting, then, it is not desirable for the government to stabilize consumption
in the face of government purchase shocks, even though it is feasible for it to do so.
Rather, the optimal policy is to somewhat reinforce the negative eﬀects that  has on
consumption, thus attenuating the eﬀects on employment and output. But, since the
implied movements in real marginal cost are temporary, they have little consequence
for the path of the price level.
7.3 Optimal policy in the benchmark model
We now calculate the response of the economy to productivity and government de-
mand shocks in the benchmark model, in which we restore the two monetary distor-
tions discussed in section 6. In each case, we ﬁnd that the solutions involve some
interest rate smoothing, in both real and nominal terms.
7.3.1 Productivity shocks
Figure 5 shows the response of the economy to a productivity shock. On impact,
consumption is slightly lower than the RBC response and then subsequently exceeds
this level very slightly. But small diﬀerences in consumption paths translate into
larger diﬀerences in growth rates and interest rates: rather than falling by 20 basis
40To draw this conclusion, Goodfriend and King contrast a small open economy facing exogenous
contingent claims prices with a closed economy setup with endogenous contingent claims prices.
32points on impact, the nominal and real interest rates decline by a good bit less (the
nominal rate falls by 7 basis points and the real rate by 8 basis points).
The dynamic behavior of real and nominal interest rates is of some interest. The
real interest rate is smoothed relative to the RBC solution, but only during the ﬁrst
few quarters, presumably because this is the interval when the eﬀects of pre-existing
prices are important for the trade-oﬀs that the monetary authority faces. Afterwards,
the real interest rate closely tracks the underlying real interest rate associated with
the RBC response. There is a small amount of expected inﬂation, which makes the
nominal interest rate even less responsive to the productivity shock than the real rate.
Yet the total eﬀect on the price level is very small: it is about 0.25% over ﬁfteen
quarters, while productivity is inducing a cumulative rise in consumption of about
11%.41 Even though they are not exactly those of the ﬂexible price solutions, the real
responses are quite close in form, indicating that the monetary authority does not
make much use of the leverage that it has over real activity to undertake stabilization
policy.
The motivation for interest rate smoothing in this economy involves the money
demand distortions, as a comparison of the results of this section with those of (7.2.1)
above makes clear. More speciﬁcally, we have found that it is the time cost distortion,
as opposed to the wedge of monetary ineﬃciency, which accounts for most of the
interest rate smoothing. It is interesting to note that maximal time costs which seem
to be quite small can motivate the monetary authority to deliver signiﬁcant smoothing
of nominal interest rates. On the other hand, this smoothing results in only small
variations in the price level, so the costs in terms of relative price distortions are
small.42
7.3.2 Government purchases
Figure 6 shows the response of economic activity to a change in government purchases
in the benchmark model. In contrast to the analysis of section (7.2.2), the response of
the economy under optimal policy now much more closely resembles that in the RBC
benchmark. That previous analysis indicated that optimal policy sought to increase
the variability of real and nominal interest rates in response to a government purchase
shock, but this incentive is now curtailed by the eﬀect of such interest rate changes
on the monetary distortions, especially the time cost. More speciﬁcally, the interest
rate smoothing motivation approximately cancels out the earlier eﬀects, leading to
outcomes that closely resemble the ﬂexible price solution.
41That is: the total eﬀect on productivity over ﬁfteen quarters is given by
1−(95)16
1−95 =1 1 2 and
over the inﬁnite horizon it is given by 1
1−95 =2 0 .
42In ongoing research, we are exploring the determinants of interest rate smoothing using a dy-
namic version of the method of eliminating selective distortions. Woodford [1999] discusses optimal
interest rate smoothing in a related model.
337.4 Robustness
In Figure 7, we summarize the interest rate and price level responses to productivity
and demand shocks in the benchmark model in the left hand column; we record
these same responses for a version of the model using the long-sample money demand
estimates in the right hand column. While there are diﬀerences across shocks and
money demand speciﬁcations, the Figure illustrates that the optimal policy responses
involve very small variations in the price level. While real interest rate behavior under
optimal policy can deviate somewhat from the RBC solution, signiﬁcant deviations
are transitory, lasting only a few periods.
8 Summary and conclusions
Optimal monetary policy depends on the nature of frictions present in the economy.
In this analysis, we have described a modern monetary model which there are a range
of frictions — imperfect competition, sticky prices and the costly exchange of wealth
for consumption — and explored the consequences for economic activity under optimal
monetary policy. More speciﬁcally, we initially developed a recursive equilibrium for
a model economy with these three frictions. We then described how to calculate
optimal allocations using the approach pioneered by Ramsey [1927], but also placed
this analysis in recursive form. To derive quantitative results, we estimated a model
of money demand, which determined the extent of transactions cost-savings, and we
calibrated other aspects of the model in ways consistent with much recent research
on imperfect competition and sticky prices.
As suggested by Friedman [1969], we found that deﬂation was one feature of an
optimal monetary policy regime. The extent of this deﬂation was small (about 0.75%)
if we used estimates of money demand based on a sample that focused on post 1950
observations. It was larger (about 2.3%) if we used estimates of money demand based
on a longer sample that included earlier observations when interest rates and velocity
were both low.
We studied the dynamic responses of economic activity under optimal policy
to productivity and government purchase shocks, using three diﬀerent assumptions
about money demand. These dynamic responses are anchored by the dynamics of the
underlying real business cycle model. Depending on the nature of the shocks and the
details of money demand, there can be interesting departures of real interest rates
and real activity from their counterparts in the real business cycle model. However,
in all cases optimal monetary policy involves very little “base drift” in the path of
the price level, relative to the deﬂationary steady state path.
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and the associated distribution weights
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
0014 0056 0126 0224 0350 0504 0686 0897 1
/0 /1 /2 /3 /4 /5 /6 /7 /8
0198 0195 0184 0161 0125 0081 0040 0012 0001Table 5:
Eﬀect of eliminating various distortions
on the long-run optimal inﬂation rate46









1 -0.76 -1.34 -1.21
2 Wedge -0.54 -0.78 -0.84
3 Time Costs -0.28 -0.86 -0.59
4 Wedge, Time Costs 0 0 0
5 Markup -0.81 -1.48 -1.27









1 -2.30 -2.84 -2.80
2 Wedge -2.03 -2.53 -2.61
3 Time Cost -0.21 -0.62 -0.42
4 Wedge, time cost 0 0 0
5 Markup -2.41 -2.93 -2.82
46The benchmark model is in row 1, i.e., all distortions are present; the wedge of monetary
ineﬃciency is eliminated in row 2; shopping time costs are eliminated in row 3; and both forms of
monetary distortion are eliminated in row 4. In row 5, the markup is ﬁxed at the zero inﬂation level
8(8 − 1). The columns are as follows: benchmark calibration discussed in section 5; (b) demand
elasticity for the diﬀerentiated products set to 6 instead of 10;.(c) the distribution of ﬁrms () is
modiﬁed from that in table 1 to  =0 302802502010 In this case, no ﬁrm goes more than
ﬁve periods with the same price, and the expected duration of a price is 38 quarters instead of 50




































































annualized RA Derivation of the real state vector
As discussed in section (2.4), the natural price component of the state vector suggested
by the model is the vector of previously determined nominal prices [P1,t P2,t ... PJ−1,t].
This appendix develops the alternative real state vector employed in our work. Since
draws entirely on the de￿nition of the price level, it could therefore be used in more
complicated environments that included additional dynamic features such as capital
formation or the distribution of price setters that arises in models of state dependent
pricing.







1−ε,a n dt h e





































































Hence, all of the future states depend only on the st−1 and on
P0,t
b Pt . This latter










1 − ω0(p0,t)1−ε ]
1
1−ε = γ0(p0,t)











For a given monetary policy function M(σ),aRecursive Equilibrium is a set of rela-
tive price functions λ(σ), w(σ), {pj(σ)}
J−1
j=0,a n dp(σ); an interest rate function R(σ);
a future in￿ation function π(σ0,σ); aggregate production, q(σ); dividends, z (σ);i n -
termediate goods producers￿ pro￿ts {zj (σ)}
J−1
j=0;v a l u ef u n c t i o n sU (•) and {vj (•)}
J−1
j=0;
household decision rules {ξ (σ),c(σ),l(σ),n(σ),m(σ),θ
0 (σ),b 0 (σ),d 0 (σ)}; retail-
ers decision rules {qj (σ)}
J−1
j=0; intermediate goods producers￿ decision rules {pj (σ)}
J−1
j=0
and a law of motion for the aggregate state σ =( ς,s,φ), s0 = Γ(σ) and φ
0 = Φ(σ) such
that: (i) households solve (2) - (7), (ii) retailers solve (14) - (15), (iii) price-setting
intermediate goods producers solve (22) - (25), and (iv) markets clear. This requires
(1) - (7), below, be satis￿ed.
1. Households solve (2) subject to (3) - (7) taking as given
(w(σ),v(σ),R(σ),z(σ),τ (σ),p(σ)). The solution to this problem, U,i sa t -
tained by {ξ (σ),c(σ),l(σ),n(σ),m(σ),θ
0 (σ),b 0 (σ),d 0 (σ)} and λ(σ) satis￿es
D2u(c(σ),l(σ)) = w (σ)λ(σ).
2. Retailers solve (14) subject to (15), taking R(σ), {pj (σ)}
J−1
j=0 and q = q(σ) as
given. The solution is described by p(σ) and qj (σ)
J−1
j=0.
3. Price-setting intermediate goods producers solve (23) - (25) subject to (22) and
(21), taking as given a(ς), w(σ),π(σ0,σ) and q(σ) as given. The solution to
this problem, {vj (•)}
J−1
j=0, is attained by {pj (σ)}
J−1
j=0 and pro￿ts are given by
zj (σ) ≡ z (pj (σ);σ), j =0 ,...,J− 1.
4. Intermediate and retail goods market equilibrium. Output of intermediate goods
is qj (σ)=pj (σ)
−ε q(σ). Given the price of the retail good, p(σ)=1 + R(σ),
production of retail goods is then given by q(σ)=c(σ)+g(ς).
5. Equilibrium in the labor markets. The demand for labor is given by nj (σ)=
qj(σ)
a(ς) ,f o rj =0 ,...,J− 1,i m p l y i n gt o t a le m p l o y m e n tn(σ)=
PJ−1
j=0 ωjnj (σ).
In equilibrium, n(σ)=1 − l(σ) − h(σ).
6. Equilibrium in the money and asset markets. The demand for real balances by
households must equal its supply, the demand for bonds by retail ￿rms must
equal their supply by households and, ￿nally, households must hold the portfolio
of intermediate goods producers who return all pro￿ts as dividends.47
(a) m =( 1 − ξ (σ))p(σ)c(σ)=M(σ)/γ1(p0 (σ))
47The bond market condition re￿ects the fact that retail goods ￿rms in our model are left holding
money and credit claims at the end of each period and cannot use this revenue to repay their
liabilities until the beginning of the next period. As a result, they must borrow to ￿nance their
purchases of intermediate inputs.(b) b0 (σ)=( 1 + R(σ)) p(σ)c(σ)
(c) θ(σ)=1 and z (σ)=
PJ−1
j=0 ωjzj (σ)
7. Rational Expectations.T h e f u t u r e i n ￿a t i o nf u n c t i o ns a t i s ￿es π(s0,ς0,σ)=
γ1(p0(σ0))γ2(p0(σ),s)
γ1(p0(σ)) where σ =( ς,s,φ), σ0 =( ς0,s 0,φ






γ2(p0(σ),s),f o rj =0 ,...,J− 3.